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THE END OF THE VIARSA SAGA AND THE LEGALITY
OF AUSTRALIA’S VESSEL FORFEITURE PENALTY FOR
ILLEGAL FISHING IN ITS EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC
ZONE
Laurence Blakely†
Abstract: The world’s fish stocks are suffering from over-utilization. The earth’s
oceans are subject to exploitation by all nation states and very little preservation.
Because of the nature of the international legal regime of the Law of the Sea,
enforcement of what conservation and management measures exist is challenging.
Boundaries, ephemeral on land, are even more so on water, making rights allocation and
management particularly difficult. Nevertheless, as fish stocks continue to decrease and
it becomes clearer that oceans require more effective management, coastal states have
begun to undertake more significant enforcement procedures corresponding to their rights
in their exclusive economic zones established under the 1982 United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea.
In particular, Australia has recently implemented a series of measures aimed at
improving the enforcement of fisheries regulations in its exclusive economic zone.
Although the motive behind these measures is to attain more effective conservation and
management of its living marine resources, Australia is pushing the boundaries of
international law and must endeavor to ensure it acts in conformity with international
law. In 1999, Australia amended its Fisheries Management Act to provide for the
automatic forfeiture of any foreign vessel caught fishing illegally in its exclusive
economic zone. Australia can and should interpret this provision to conform to the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In December 2007, the infamous Uruguayan-flagged longline fishing
vessel Viarsa I finally came to rest on the shores of Mumbai and is presently
standing-by to be demolished and sold as scrap in the Indian ship-breaking
yards.1 Viarsa I was the object of one of the longest hot pursuits in history,2
and one so sensational that it was the subject of a widely successful novel by
a journalist for the Wall Street Journal.3 In August 2003, the Australian
Fisheries and Customs patrol vessel Southern Supporter chased Viarsa I for
†
The author would like to thank Professor Craig H. Allen at the University of Washington School
of Law, the editorial staff at the Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal, and her friends and family.
1
Australian Fisheries Management Authority Update, Vol. V, Issue 1, Jan. 15, 2008,
http://www.afma.gov.au/information/publications/newsletters/afma_update/docs/update_0501/TMPfhjsmu
o5x4.htm (last visited May 12, 2008) [hereinafter AFMA website].
2
The doctrine of hot pursuit allows a coastal state to extend its jurisdiction beyond its exclusive
economic zone (“EEZ”). It is codified in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 111,
Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 396, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/
texts/unclos/closindx.htm [hereinafter LOSC].
3
G. BRUCE KNECHT, HOOKED: PIRATES, POACHING, AND THE PERFECT FISH (Rodale Inc. 2006).
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twenty-one days over almost 4,000 nautical miles, through an iceberg-strewn
stormy Southern Ocean in the middle of winter.4 Having detected Viarsa I
allegedly violating fisheries regulations in Australia’s exclusive economic
zone (“EEZ”), Southern Supporter initiated hot pursuit, finally catching up
with Viarsa I in the South Atlantic Ocean and escorting her back to
Australia.5 Although the crew was eventually acquitted of all criminal
charges by an Australian jury because evidence of the violation was only
circumstantial,6 the Commonwealth still confiscated the vessel as forfeited,
pursuant to section 106A of the Fisheries Management Act (“FMA”).7 The
owners of the vessel challenged this forfeiture in Australian courts, as
allowed by the FMA.8 Four years later, the Federal Court of Western
Australia finally dismissed the Viarsa I owner’s application challenging this
forfeiture,9 enabling the Australian Fisheries Management Authority
(“AFMA”) to initiate the dismantling process and bring to a close the Viarsa
saga.10
The saga, however, may yet continue. It remains unclear whether
Australia’s forfeiture provision, section 106A of the FMA, is consistent with
international law. Although the 1982 United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (“LOSC”)11 does not specifically address whether forfeiture
is an allowable method of enforcement of a coastal state’s fisheries
regulations, in its most recent case, the Tomimaru, the International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea, (“ITLOS”), recognized the issue without resolving

4
AFMA website, supra note 1; see also COLTO–Coalition of Legal Toothfish Operators website,
http://www.colto.org/Articles_Latest_Viarsa_Photos.htm (last visited May 12, 2008) (providing photo
account of the hot pursuit).
5
Australia claims an EEZ encompassing the waters 200 nautical miles off its coast pursuant to
LOSC. LOSC, supra note 2, art. 55 (entitled “Specific legal regime of the exclusive economic zone”). A
coastal state has sovereign rights over the natural resources in its EEZ. Id. art. 56(1)(a).
6
See Ribot-Cabrera & Ors v. The Queen (2004) WASCA 101 (May 18, 2004); Amanda Banks,
$30m Claim After Fishers Freed, THE AUSTRALIAN, Nov. 7, 2005, at local section p. 4.
7
Fisheries Management Act, 1991, C2007C00487, § 106A (Austl.), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/ (search for “fisheries management act”; then follow “FISHERIES
MANAGEMENT ACT 1991 - SECT 1 Short title” hyperlink; then follow “Management Act” hyperlink)
[hereinafter FMA] (allowing Australia to claim as automatically forfeited vessels found to have violated
certain fisheries regulations within Australia’s EEZ).
8
AFMA website, supra note 1; Banks, supra note 6.
9
Order Entered in the Fed. Ct. of Austl. W. Dist. No. WAD253/2003 (Feb. 27, 2007) (Gilmour, J.)
available at http://www.fedcourt.gov.au (dismissing applicant’s challenge to the forfeiture).
10
AFMA website, supra note 1.
11
As of February 1, 2008, 155 states have ratified LOSC. A table recapitulating the status of the
Convention and of the related Agreements, as of October 26, 2007, is available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_agreements.htm (last visited Mar. 4.
2008).

JUNE 2008

AUSTRALIA’S VESSEL FORFEITURE PROVISION

679

it.12 Presiding ITLOS Judge Rüdiger Wolfrum, in his statement to the
Plenary of the United Nations General Assembly in December 2007,
described the Tomimaru case as raising questions concerning “the
confiscation of a vessel and the relation between national and international
rules.”13 Judge Wolfrum noted on behalf of ITLOS that, although the Law
of the Sea Convention makes no reference to confiscation provisions, “many
States have provided for measures of confiscation of fishing vessels in their
legislation with respect to the management and conservation of marine
living resources.”14 As such, ITLOS is primed to hear further cases
regarding confiscation15 measures, rendering Australia’s related enforcement
actions susceptible to challenge.
This Comment argues that vessel forfeiture provisions are a valid
mechanism for coastal states to enforce their laws and regulations as long as
the provisions do not upset the balance between flag and coastal states rights
established in Part V of LOSC.16 In particular, Australia’s forfeiture
provision should be interpreted so as to conform with LOSC. Part II of this
Comment exposes illegal fishing and depleting fish stocks as a time sensitive
worldwide issue and provides an overview of the EEZ, the legal regime
through which coastal states effectively manage fisheries. It then introduces
the ITLOS cases discussing the confiscation issue and lays out the Australian
forfeiture legislation. Part III analyzes LOSC Article 73 and ITLOS case
law to establish that forfeiture is an allowable coastal state enforcement
measure, as long as it conforms to certain requirements. Part III then
proposes a test to determine the legality of forfeiture provisions. Part IV
applies this test to the Australian statute, concluding that the statute can, and
should, be interpreted to conform with international law.

12
The Tomimaru Case (Japan v. Rus. Fed.), Judgment, I.T.L.O.S. Case No. 15, ¶¶ 72-76 (Aug. 6,
2007) [hereinafter Tomimaru].
13
Rudiger Wolfrum, President of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (“ITLOS”),
Statement to the Plenary of the Sixty-Second Session of the United Nations General Assembly (Dec. 10,
2007), at ¶ 22, available at http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (follow “News” hyperlink; then follow
“Statements of the President” hyperlink) [hereinafter Wolfrum UN Statement].
14
Id. (quoting Tomimaru, supra note 12, ¶ 72).
15
Although confiscation is not a familiar term in admiralty, it is used extensively by ITLOS, and
simply changes the acting party. For example, the vessel owner forfeits the vessel, and Australia
confiscates the vessel. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 131, 297 (3d pocket ed. 2006).
16
See LOSC, supra note 2, Part V entitled “Exclusive Economic Zone.”
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ITLOS CASES HAVE CENTERED AROUND COASTAL STATES’ FISHERIES
REGULATIONS ENACTED TO ADDRESS DEPLETING FISH STOCKS

Although many coastal states have adopted forfeiture provisions
pursuant to their LOSC EEZ powers, ITLOS cases and LOSC articles
demonstrate the importance of the balance between coastal and flag state
rights. ITLOS has heard cases related to coastal state forfeiture provisions
adopted pursuant to EEZ jurisdiction, but has not ruled on the validity of the
provisions. The EEZ regime extends the jurisdiction of coastal states over
living marine resources. Growing concerns with illegal fishing, lax flag
state enforcement, and depleted fish stocks have contributed to the creation
of the EEZ regime in LOSC.
A.

Illegal Fishing and Depleting Fish Stocks Are Time-Sensitive WorldWide Problems Exacerbated by Lax Flag State Enforcement

Fish stocks around the world are depleting rapidly. Overfishing is
recognized as a major worldwide problem.17 As of 2005, half of the world’s
fisheries were deemed fully exploited, one-quarter not quite fully exploited,
leaving a full one-quarter of the world’s fisheries overexploited, depleted, or
recovering (seventeen percent, seven percent, and one percent,
respectively).18 Over the past twenty years, the proportion of depleted and
overexploited stocks has remained stable following a steep rise in the 1970s
and 1980s.19 In the mid-1970s, the proportion of overexploited or depleted
fisheries was only ten percent, as compared to twenty-five percent today.20
Illegal fishing, as part of Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (“IUU”)
fishing, is a significant contributor to the issue.21
Lax flag state enforcement persists as a significant challenge in
curtailing illegal fishing. Flag states have exclusive jurisdiction over their
vessels on the high seas, subject to certain exceptions through which other
states are specifically granted jurisdiction.22 Despite the duty of flag states
17

U.N. FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Dep’t, The State of the World Fisheries and Aquaculture
2006, at 7, U.N. Doc. (2007) [hereinafter SOFIA Report].
18
Id. at 29.
19
Id. at 7.
20
Id. at 17, 29.
21
See generally U.N. FAO, Committee on Fisheries [COFI], Report of the Twenty-Seventh Session
of the Committee on Fisheries, Combating Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Through
Monitering, Control and Surveillance, Port State Measures and Other Means, U.N. Doc. E/COFI/2007/7
(Mar. 5-9, 2007) (discussing the worldwide problem of IUU fishing and the implementation of port state
measures).
22
LOSC, supra note 2, arts. 92, 87; see also R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA
208 (3rd ed. 1999) (stating that the EEZ regime grants extensive jurisdiction to the coastal state).
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to enforce coastal state regulations and comply with relevant Regional
Fisheries Management Organization (“RFMO”) guidelines onboard their
vessels, lax enforcement by “flag of convenience”23 states is a widespread
and global issue—the ramifications of which are felt acutely in the context
of illegal fishing.24 Under LOSC, flag states have a duty to “comply with
the conservation measures and with the other terms and conditions
established in the laws and regulations of the coastal state.”25 This imposes
significant responsibilities on flag states. Nevertheless, the continued
widespread use of flags of convenience “exacerbates the extent and scope of
IUU fishing.”26 The fundamental right of flag state jurisdiction,27 combined
with lax flag state enforcement, creates further challenges for coastal states
in implementing fisheries conservation and management measures.
To make matters worse, illegal fishers are increasingly sophisticated,
well-funded, and able to work around coastal state conservation and
management measures. Organized criminal activity in illegal fishing is
recognized as a problem around the world.28 In some cases, RFMO
secretariats have received threats when implementing measures to combat
IUU fishing, demonstrating the criminal nature of IUU fishing.29 The
increased sophistication of IUU fishing indicates the highly organized nature
of the criminal actors and hinders the conservation and management
measures undertaken by coastal states and the corresponding RFMOs.30 To
avoid detection, vessel owners create corporate arrangements as a shield
23
Flags of convenience, or open registry vessels, refer to vessels flying the flag of a country other
than the country of ownership. See U.N. FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Dep’t, “Flag of Convenience” or
Open Registry Fishing Vessels, http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/14818 (last visited Apr. 24, 2008). These
have been described as “pirates, bad actors and the scourge of the ocean.” Id.
24
See generally MATHEW GIANNI & WALT SIMPSON, THE CHANGING NATURE OF HIGH SEAS
FISHING: HOW FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE PROVIDE COVER FOR ILLEGAL, UNREPORTED AND UNREGULATED
FISHING (Austl. Dep’t of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Int’l Transport Workers’ Federation, WWF
Int’l, 2005), available at http://www.daff.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/5858/iuu_flags_of_
convenience.pdf (discussing the role of flags of convenience in Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated
(“IUU”) fishing).
25
LOSC, supra note 2, art. 62(4).
26
SOFIA Report, supra note 17, at 56.
27
Flag states traditionally have jurisdiction over their vessels, and exclusive jurisdiction over their
vessels on the high seas. See LOSC, supra note 2, art. 87.
28
Corporate crime in IUU fishing was a subject of various recent international conferences. For
example, the 34th Annual Conference of The Maritime Law Association of Australia and New Zealand
(Sept. 2007) held a session on “Organized Crime in Australia’s Fishing Industry: International
Connections.” Also, the 18th Annual European Association of Fisheries Economists Conference (July
2007) included a paper entitled: “Non-Compliance in Fisheries: A Corporate Crime Perspective,” by Linda
Nostbakken and Frank Jensen. See generally The XVIIIth Annual EAFE Conference Website,
http://www.eafe2007.hi.is/index.html (last visited Apr. 24 2008).
29
SOFIA Report, supra note 17, at 56.
30
Id.
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against investigations and frequently change vessel names, call numbers, and
flags.31 In the fight against IUU fishing, this organized corporate element
adds a significant burden on the coastal states in their endeavor to conserve
and manage the living resources in their EEZs.
B.

The EEZ Legal Regime Created in LOSC Balances the Interests of the
Coastal and Flag States

Over the past several decades, the Law of the Sea has evolved through
the “creeping jurisdiction” of coastal states beyond their territorial seas and
into the ocean.32 Previously, most of the world’s oceans were comprised of
“high seas,” on which flag states possessed exclusive jurisdiction over their
vessels and all states enjoyed unrestricted access to resources.33 More and
more states began to claim something akin to an EEZ: an area of ocean
contiguous to their territorial seas in which they had jurisdiction over natural
resources, especially fisheries.34 The drafting of LOSC evolved to provide
management frameworks and enforcement structures beyond the territorial
sea, where before flag states exercised exclusive jurisdiction.35 This
paralleled a growing understanding of, and desire to manage, natural
resources and marine pollution, as well as a recognition of political theories
such as the “tragedy of the commons”36 and the “race to the bottom.”37 As a
result, coastal states today claim sovereign rights 200 miles offshore,
31

See GIANNI & SIMPSON, supra note 24, at 12.
See generally Barbara Kwiatkowska, Creeping Jurisdiction Beyond 200 Miles in the Light of the
1982 Law of the Sea Convention and State Practice, 22 OCEAN DEV. AND INT’L L. 153 (1991) (examining
the extensions of coastal state rights and jurisdictions beyond the twelve mile territorial sea); see also
David Freestone, The Effective Conservation and Management of High Seas Living Resources: Towards a
New Regime?, 5 CANTERBURY L. REV. 341, 343 (1995) (examining the impact of the extension of coastal
state jurisdiction).
33
See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the High Seas art. 1, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450
U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter CHS] (stating that a coastal state’s jurisdiction beyond internal waters is over a
territorial sea of twelve nautical miles). High seas are “all parts of the sea that are not included in the
territorial sea or in the internal waters of a state.” Id.
34
For example, the Truman Proclamation stated the policy of the United States regarding the need
for conservation zones and protection of fisheries resources, and claimed the right to regulate and control
fishing activities in these “conservation zones,” while maintaining the right of “free and unimpeded
navigation.” 2 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, 1982: A COMMENTARY 493
(Myron H. Nordquist ed., 1985) [hereinafter Nordquist vol. II].
35
See CHS, supra note 33.
36
“Tragedy of the commons” is an expression of the conflict between individual interests and the
common good in the management of finite resources. Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons,
SCIENCE MAG., Dec. 13, 1968, at 1243.
37
“Race to the bottom” is a theoretical phenomenon occurring when competition between states
leads to a decline in regulatory standards. The term was coined by Justice Brandeis in Louis K. Liggett Co.
v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 558-59 (1933). For example, in the case of vessel registries, states with fewer
regulations will attract more vessel registrations, and become “flag of convenience” states.
32
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RFMOs assert authority over vast expanses of ocean, and port states
undertake market control measures.38 Nevertheless, striking a balance
between the rights of the flag state and those of the coastal state within what
would become the EEZ remained central to the evolving framework.39
Ultimately adopting the EEZ as a formal regime, LOSC sought to
integrate a comprehensive regulation of coastal states’ claims to rights
beyond their territorial seas.40 Although the regime was created by LOSC, it
had roots in the earlier conventions.41 The resulting EEZ was arguably the
most complex and multifaceted regime in LOSC: an “intricately designed
structuring of rights, jurisdiction, and duties—variously allocated between
coastal States and the general community of States.”42 Consequently,
balancing conflicting rights and interests within the EEZ has proven to be
tremendously difficult.
In considering whether to adopt the EEZ regime, a novel concept at
the time, states were concerned with preserving the fundamental rights of the
law of the sea: freedom of fishing and of navigation. Reports prepared
while drafting LOSC’s EEZ section reflect the concern among states that an
extension of the jurisdiction of coastal states beyond the territorial sea would
“have to be matched by a statement of general rights of the international
community in that extended zone.”43
Once again, conserving a balance between coastal and flag states was
a key part of the section of LOSC that created the EEZ.44 Coastal states, on
the one hand, have jurisdiction to prescribe enforcement procedures in their
EEZs under LOSC.45 Prescriptive jurisdiction in the EEZ allows coastal
states to establish laws and regulations that relate to fisheries and
enforcement procedures for the conservation and utilization of the living
resources.46
Article 73 of LOSC elaborates on the enforcement procedures that a
coastal state may undertake in its EEZ, setting forth coastal state
38
See generally Judith Swan, Port State Measures to Combat IUU Fishing: International and
Regional Developments, 7 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 38 (2006) (discussing international and regional
port state measures).
39
See Nordquist vol. II, supra note 34, 493-500.
40
Id. at 496.
41
Id. at 493 (citing the 1930 Hague Conference for the Codification of International Law, Report
Adopted by the Second Committee, League of Nations, III Acts of the Conference for the Codification of
International Law, League of Nations Doc. C.351(b).M.145(b) 1930 V., Annex V, at 209).
42
Nordquist vol. II, supra note 34, at 508.
43
Id. at 496-97.
44
LOSC, supra note 2, Part V.
45
LOSC, supra note 2, art. 62(4).
46
Id.
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enforcement jurisdiction in respective EEZs while ensuring the flag states’
right to “prompt release” actions.47 Paragraph (1) grants coastal states the
right to “take such measures, including boarding, inspection, arrest and
judicial proceedings, as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the
laws and regulations adopted by it in conformity with this Convention.”48
Flag states, on the other hand, received the assurance of “prompt
release” to offset this increase in coastal state jurisdiction. Article 73
provides that “[a]rrested vessels shall be promptly released upon the posting
of a reasonable bond or security.”49 By cross-referencing Article 292,
Article 73 gives the flag state of a vessel the right to bring a “prompt
release” action in ITLOS to demand its vessel be released by the coastal
state on certain conditions.50 Article 73 contains additional flag state interest
safeguards, including the prohibition of imprisonment and corporal
punishment as a penalty for the violation of a fisheries regulation,51 and a
requirement that the coastal state notify the flag state of arrests of vessels
and subsequent punitive measures.52 The notice requirement ensures that the
flag state can initiate “prompt release” proceedings.
C.

ITLOS Addressed the Confiscation Issue Within Article 292 “Prompt
Release” Proceedings Brought Pursuant to Vessel Forfeiture Actions

Annex VI of LOSC establishes ITLOS and charges it with interpreting
LOSC to resolve disputes between parties to the Convention.53 ITLOS
applies LOSC, as well as “other international law not incompatible with the
Convention.”54 The twenty-one elected members of ITLOS must have the
highest reputation for “fairness and integrity” and “a recognized competence
in the field of the law of the sea.”55 In addition, “equitable geographical
distribution” and representation on ITLOS of the world’s principal legal
47
Prompt release is a “procedure provided by [LOSC], introduced before a court or an international
tribunal . . . by the flag State whose vessel is detained by the authorities of a State party to the convention,
which alleges a violation of the provisions of the Convention providing for the prompt release.” Erik
Franckx, “Reasonable Bond” in the Practice of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 32 CAL.
W. INT’L L. J. 303, 310, n.40 (2002).
48
LOSC, supra note 2, art. 73(1).
49
Id. art. 73(2).
50
This procedure is referred to as a “‘prompt release’ proceeding” throughout this Comment. See
infra Part II.C.
51
LOSC, supra note 2, art. 73(3).
52
Id. art. 73(4).
53
Id. art. 293, Annex VI, art. 23. ITLOS is one of several available forums for compulsory dispute
resolution provided for in LOSC Part XV. See generally Frankx, supra note 47 (discussing dispute
resolution provided for in LOSC).
54
LOSC, supra note 2, Annex VI, art. 23 (referring to LOSC art. 293).
55
Id.
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systems are assured,56 and no two members may be nationals of the same
state.57 As such, ITLOS represents an impartial and significant authority in
LOSC interpretation.
ITLOS has heard several “prompt release” proceedings brought
because of coastal state actions confiscating foreign vessels pursuant to
forfeiture provisions.58 Article 292 grants ITLOS compulsory jurisdiction to
resolve “prompt release” disputes, including ones in which a flag state
alleges that a coastal state did not comply with its duty under Article 73(2)
(to release a seized vessel upon the posting of a “reasonable bond”), and
demands that it do so.59
The procedural posture, however, prevented ITLOS from ruling on the
merits of any of these cases;60 thus, the judgments did not directly address
the legality of the confiscation provisions. ITLOS jurisdiction in “prompt
release” cases is limited to dealing “only with the question of release,
without prejudice to the merits of any case before the appropriate domestic
forum against the vessel.”61 Furthermore, it is in ITLOS’s interest to deliver
narrow holdings to increase its credibility among states parties and the
international community.62 Judgments from “prompt release” actions
therefore usually do not relate to factual and legal issues involved in a
forfeiture proceeding. Instead, the judgments deal solely with the immediate
issue of what a “reasonable bond” for the release of a vessel is in a given
case.
Nevertheless, because so many “prompt release” cases litigated in
ITLOS have stemmed directly from a coastal state claiming a vessel as
forfeited pursuant to its fisheries regulations, a discussion of these cases is
relevant. In addition, this litigation has produced many separate opinions
that discuss the legal and factual specificities of coastal state vessel
forfeiture provisions. In their decisions, members of ITLOS take the
opportunity to express themselves in separate opinions. For example, the

56

Id.
LOSC, supra note 2, Annex VI, art. 3(1).
58
See, e.g., Tomimaru, supra note 12; The Hoshinmaru Case (Jap. v. Rus. Fed.), I.T.L.O.S. Case No.
14 (Aug. 6, 2007); The Juno Trader Case (St. Vincent & the Grenadines v. Guinea-Bissau), I.T.L.O.S.
Case No. 13 (Dec. 18, 2004) [hereinafter Juno Trader]; The Volga Case (Rus. Fed. v. Austl.), I.T.L.O.S.
Case No. 11 (Dec. 23, 2002); The Grand Prince Case (Belize v. Fr.), I.T.L.O.S. Case No. 8 (Apr. 20,
2001); available at http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (follow “Proceedings and Judgments” hyperlink).
59
LOSC, supra note 2, arts. 73, 292.
60
Id. art. 292.
61
Id. art. 292(3).
62
See John E. Noyes, The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 32 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 109,
157 (1998).
57
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Juno Trader case produced eight separate opinions signed by ten judges.63
Unlike ITLOS judgments, which are generally narrow, the separate opinions
tend to be a bit more expansive. These separate opinions are also valuable
analytical resources as reflections by highly qualified authorities on the law
of the sea.64
Out of the nine “prompt release” cases heard by ITLOS in the course
of its existence,65 four deserve special attention because they deal
specifically with vessels forfeited to a coastal state due to that coastal state’s
LOSC enforcement jurisdiction.66 The Tomimaru case, ITLOS’s most
recent, involved Japan, the flag state, filing a case against Russia, the coastal
state, after Russia confiscated the Tomimaru as forfeited pursuant to its
fisheries regulations in its EEZ.67 After boarding the vessel, the Russian
authorities assessed that the vessel had caught more fish than its permit
allowed.68 Litigation ensued within the Russian court system, culminating
with the Russian Supreme Court’s denial of Japan’s appeal to the lower
court’s forfeiture finding.69 This appeal was pending when Japan instituted
proceedings at ITLOS, and was denied by the time ITLOS rendered its
judgment.70 As such, this case provides insight on ITLOS’s treatment of a
“prompt release” action due to vessel forfeiture while a proceeding is taking
place in a coastal state’s domestic courts.
Because the facts of the Volga case involved the application of
Australia’s forfeiture provision discussed in this Comment, the Volga
opinions are relevant. Even though the Australian forfeiture statute was
implicated in the Volga case, ITLOS did not rule on its legality.71 Instead,
the case centered on the nature of the bond Australia demanded as a

63
Juno Trader, supra note 58. Judges Kolodin, Anderson, Cot, Part, Meshaw, Wolfrum,
Chandresekhara Rao, Treves, Ndiaye, and Lucky all filed declarations or separate opinions.
64
See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
65
ITLOS heard its first case in 1997 (The Saiga Case (St. Vincent v. Guinea), I.T.L.O.S. Case No. 1
(Dec. 4 1997), also a “prompt release” case) and has heard fifteen cases total. See ITLOS website,
http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (follow “Proceedings and Judgments” hyperlink) (last visited May 12,
2008).
66
Tomimaru, supra note 12; Juno Trader, supra note 58; Volga, supra note 58; Grand Prince, supra
note 58.
67
Tomimaru, supra note 12, Judgment ¶¶ 26, 44.
68
Id. Judgment ¶ 25.
69
Id. Judgment ¶¶ 37-46.
70
Id. Judgment ¶ 62.
71
See Volga, supra note 58, Judgment ¶¶ 50, 76 (citing the Australian statute applied in the case and
stating: “it is not appropriate in the present proceedings to consider whether a coastal State is entitled to
impose such conditions in the exercise of its sovereign rights under the Convention.”); but see id. Separate
Opinion of Judge Cot, ¶¶ 11-13 (stating that Australia’s enforcement and prevention measures fall within
LOSC and international organizations’ efforts to combat IUU fishing).
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condition on the release of the vessel.72 Russia, this time acting as the flag
state, brought the action to ITLOS.73 The Volga had been forfeited pursuant
to FMA section 106A for a violation of Australia’s fisheries regulations, and
the owners contested the forfeiture in Australian courts while the flag state
brought the ITLOS case.74 Because the forfeiture case was still pending in
Australia when ITLOS rendered its decision, the Volga facts substantially
differ from the Tomimaru facts.75 However, like in the Tomimaru case,
ITLOS had to deal with possible complementarity issues due the ongoing
domestic court proceeding.76 This relationship between ITLOS and
domestic proceedings is key when analyzing the legality of a forfeiture
provision.
The Grand Prince similarly involved a coastal state’s forfeiture
provision, this time France’s.77 Unlike the Volga and the Tomimaru cases,
where the judgments were unanimous, this case prompted a significant
dissent. Nine of the twenty-one judges disagreed with the tribunal’s finding
that Belize was not the flag state of the vessel.78 They expressed regret that
such a finding prevented the tribunal from considering, as a legal question,
the relationship between “prompt release” proceedings under Article 292 and
“the merits of cases before the domestic forum of the detaining State,”79
indicating their interest in resolving the issue under ITLOS jurisdiction.
In the Juno Trader, ITLOS touched on notions of international due
process standards. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines brought the action
against Guinea-Bissau for the release of the Juno Trader, which GuineaBissau had seized pursuant to a fisheries regulation infraction.80 ITLOS
unanimously found that Guinea-Bissau had not complied with LOSC Article
73(2) and ordered Guinea-Bissau to release the seized vessel.81 Several of
the separate opinions also expressed concern over the lack of due process in
72

Id. Judgment ¶ 76.
Id. Judgment ¶ 1.
Olbers Co. Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Austl. & Ors. (No. 4) (2004) 205 A.L.R. 432 (Austl.), aff’d,
212 A.L.R. 325 (2004) (Austl.) [hereinafter Olbers].
75
Volga, supra note 58, Judgment ¶ 52.
76
Complementarity is the concept of ceding jurisdiction to a national court over an international
tribunal. See, e.g., Int’l Crim. Ct., Rome Statute art. 17(a), July 1, 2002, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9*
(making inadmissible in the International Court cases already being investigated or prosecuted by a state
with jurisdiction).
77
Grand Prince, supra note 58, Judgment ¶ 59.
78
It’s unclear what the flag state was at the time of seizure because the vessel had documentation
from Belize providing conflicting information. Id. Judgment ¶¶ 76, 93.
79
Grand Prince, supra note 58, Dissenting Opinion of Judges Caminos, Rangel, Yankov,
Yamamoto, Akl, Vukas, Marsit, Eiriksson, Jesus, ¶ 17.
80
Juno Trader, supra note 58, Judgment ¶ 69.
81
Juno Trader, supra note 58, Judgment ¶ 80.
73
74
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the Guinean proceedings.82 Significant to the decision was that GuineaBissau did not provide notice of the seizure to the flag state.83 The Juno
Trader provides an example of a possibly illegal forfeiture provision.
Although ITLOS has heard litigation due to forfeiture provisions, it
has not actually held that they are allowed or what type is allowed.
However, the separate and dissenting opinions provide some guidance for
determining the legality of a coastal state’s forfeiture provision. The Juno
Trader, the Grand Prince, the Volga, and the Tomimaru were all brought to
ITLOS due to a coastal state’s forfeiture proceedings. These cases present
various possible factual scenarios relating to forfeiture provisions and
provide reference points for a possible legal test.84
D.

Australia Has Enacted a Confiscation Provision Pursuant to Its
Sovereign Right to Conserve and Manage the Living Resources in Its
EEZ

In accordance with the LOSC article granting coastal states the power
to prescribe enforcement measures in their EEZs, Australia sets forth
enforcement mechanisms against illegal fishing in the Fisheries
Management Act.85 Administrators of the Act are charged with ensuring that
the conservation and management measures in Australia’s EEZ and on the
high seas “implement Australia’s obligations under international agreements
that deal with fish stocks.”86 This language indicates a link between
Australia’s domestic law and the international agreements it is party to,
including LOSC. Section 106A of the FMA provides for automatic
“forfeiture of things used in certain offences,” including vessels used for
IUU fishing in the EEZ, and their catch.87 The Australian legislature added
the “automatic” nature of the forfeiture provision when it amended the FMA
in 1999.88
The FMA sets forth procedures in confiscating a foreign vessel fishing
illegally. Section 106C of the Act requires the enforcement officer to give
written notice of the seizure.89 The notice must contain information on how
82
Id. at Separate Opinion of Judges Mensah and Wolfrum ¶¶ 5-6; id. at Separate Opinion of Judge
Chandrasekhara Rao ¶ 8.
83
Id. at Judgment ¶ 76.
84
See infra Part III.B.
85
LOSC, supra note 2, art. 62(4)(k); FMA, supra note 7.
86
FMA, supra note 7, Part 1(3)(2)(c).
87
Id. § 106A. Section 106 of the FMA is also a forfeiture provision, but its functioning is not
automatic and the section is not discussed in this Comment.
88
Fisheries Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1), 1999.
89
FMA, supra note 7, § 106C.
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to challenge the forfeiture of the seized vessel and include the address of the
Managing Director of the Australian Fisheries Management Authority,
(“AFMA”), to whom a claim challenging the forfeiture must be made.90
Once the claim is made, the claimant has two months to institute
proceedings in Australian courts to enforce it.91 If the claimant does not
obtain a court order, the seized vessel is forfeited to the Commonwealth.92
The AFMA is charged with implementing the FMA. As such, it is the
body responsible for instituting forfeiture proceedings, or in the case of an
automatic forfeiture, responding to a flag state or owner’s challenge to the
forfeiture. Once the vessel is forfeited, the AFMA must dispose of it. The
AFMA has various mechanisms for managing the confiscation
proceedings.93
In sum, LOSC created a regime, the EEZ, which allocates sovereign
rights over natural resources in the EEZ to coastal states, while protecting
flag states’ rights through “prompt release” actions. A coastal state’s right to
implement a forfeiture provision specifically is not established as legal, but
ITLOS has heard litigation related to such clauses.94 Although many states
have implemented forfeiture provisions, Australia’s is unique because it is
“automatic.”
III.

CONFISCATION IS A VALID EXERCISE OF A COASTAL STATE’S SOVEREIGN
RIGHTS, PROVIDED IT PRESERVES FLAG STATES’ RIGHTS

Although the confiscation of vessels is not specifically provided for in
Article 73, it is also not prohibited.95 Because it is not prohibited by LOSC,
the confiscation of fishing vessels as a penalty for illegal fishing within an
EEZ is consistent with Article 73.96 In its most recent case, ITLOS
recognized that many states do have forfeiture provisions aimed at
prevention and deterrence of illegal fishing activities.97 Undisputed state
practice supports this,98 as many states other than Australia also have

90

Id. § 106D.
Id. § 106F.
Id. § 106G(2). This section allows claimants to challenge legal or factual findings in the
Australian courts. However, the section does not set a legal test for obtaining a court order. Id.
93
See AFMA website, supra note 1.
94
See supra Part II.C.
95
LOSC, supra note 2, art. 73(4).
96
Tomimaru, supra note 12, Separate Opinion of Judge Jesus ¶ 6.
97
Id. at Judgment ¶ 72.
98
Id. at Separate Opinion of Judge Jesus ¶ 6 (stating that the confiscation measures “seem to be
supported by undisputed state practice”).
91
92
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confiscation provisions.99 An analysis of pertinent LOSC articles and past
ITLOS litigation presents a possible two-part test for determining the
legality of a forfeiture provision: it may not deny a flag state access to a
“prompt release” action, and it must grant access to a domestic forum in
which the flag state can effectively challenge the forfeiture. These two
prongs encompass the overarching goals of conserving the balance between
coastal and flag states’ rights and ensuring some level of due process.
A.

A Textual Analysis of Article 73 Indicates That Confiscation Is a Valid
Enforcement Measure

Article 73 allows a coastal state to “take such measures, including
boarding, inspection, arrest, and judicial proceedings, as may be necessary to
ensure compliance with the laws and regulations adopted by it in conformity
with this Convention,” in the exercise of its sovereign rights over the living
resources in the EEZ.100
1.

The List of Enforcement Measures in Article 73(1) Is Non-Exhaustive

Article 73(1) is a non-exhaustive list of allowable coastal state
enforcement measures. Although the acting phrase “boarding, inspection,
arrest, and judicial proceedings” is not preceded by the words inter alia or
the like, interpreting the list as non-exhaustive is consistent with the
language in Article 73.101 That the drafting committee included inter alia in
its list of allowable coastal state laws and regulations in Article 62(4)102 does
not necessarily mean that the absence of these words in Article 73(1)
indicates the list is exhaustive. The list in Article 62(4) is much longer than
the one in Article 73(1) and relates to a more general allowance of
prescriptive jurisdiction, which allocates the right to enact laws and
regulations, as opposed to enforcement jurisdiction, which allocates the right
to enforce laws and regulations. The different nature of the two articles
explains the different language. The subsections of Article 73 also suggest
that the omission of the specific term was not intended to limit enforcement
actions to those enumerated in the article.103 This is further supported by the
fact that several ITLOS judges believe that the list is non-exhaustive. In
99
For example, the Federated States of Micronesia, France, United States, United Kingdom, and
Marshall Islands all have vessel forfeiture provisions.
100
LOSC, supra note 2, art. 73(1).
101
Id. art. 73.
102
Id. art. 62(4).
103
Id. art. 73.
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fact, some have even stated specifically that vessel confiscation is
allowed.104
Article 73(3) specifically enumerates prohibited coastal state
enforcement measures, further indicating that the list in paragraph 1 is nonexhaustive.
Coastal state penalties for violations of their fisheries
regulations “may not include imprisonment . . . or any other form of corporal
punishment.”105 As such, one can reason that what is not prohibited is
allowed.
2.

The Language in Article 73 Allocates Broader Enforcement Power to
Coastal States Regarding Living Resources than Other LOSC Articles
Relating to the Enforcement Jurisdiction of Coastal States

LOSC grants enforcement jurisdiction to coastal states in several
different contexts. In particular, LOSC Articles 220 and 230 address
enforcement of marine environment pollution and protection in the EEZ.106
As compared to these enforcement articles in LOSC, Article 73 grants more
expansive rights and discretion to the coastal state. The language is
considerably stronger than that of other articles in LOSC that relate to
enforcement measures, indicating the drafting committee’s desire to grant
the broadest enforcement powers in the case of living resources. This
resonates with conservation concerns driving the creation of the EEZ.107
Enforcement measures relating to protection of the marine environment in
the EEZ are restricted to “monetary penalties.”108 Similarly, enforcement
jurisdiction of coastal states for the “protection and preservation of the
marine environment” only allows for the detention of vessels, as opposed to
the arrest allowed in Article 73.109
Article 73 grants discretion to the coastal state to determine the limits
of its enforcement jurisdiction pursuant to its sovereign rights over living
resources in its EEZ. Unlike Article 220, which requires that there be “clear
grounds for believing that a foreign vessel while navigating in the EEZ has
committed a violation,”110 Article 73 allows the state to take measures “as
104
See, e.g., Juno Trader, supra note 58, Separate Opinion of Judges Menshaw and Wolfrum ¶ 3
(“we do not question the right of a coastal State to provide in its laws that fishing vessels . . . may be
confiscated”); Tomimaru, supra note 12, Separate Opinion of Judge Jesus ¶¶ 5-6 (stating that confiscation
is allowed by Article 73(1)).
105
LOSC, supra note 2, art. 73(3).
106
Id. arts. 220, 230, in Part XII, “Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment.”
107
See supra Part II.B.
108
LOSC, supra note 2, art. 230.
109
Id.
110
Id. art. 220.
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may be necessary” to ensure compliance with its laws and regulations
relating to living resources.111 Indeed, this “as may be necessary” limit to
enforcement procedures grants discretion to determine what may be
necessary to the coastal state, resulting in a broad grant of power to that
state.
The drafting committee repeatedly opted to allow for broader
enforcement jurisdiction in Article 73, as compared to those in other LOSC
articles providing for enforcement jurisdiction.112 The term “boarding”
implies going on board a ship for enforcement purposes, including the use of
armed forces.113 Article 73 also specifically allows for “arrest” of vessels,
rather than limiting state action to “detention.” This is significant because it
marks a deliberate permission of in rem actions against the ship or vessel
under Article 73, which the committee declined to provide in Article 220.114
The limitation of “inspection” to the examination of certain documents in
Article 220 is similarly not present in Article 73, once again indicating
broader allowance to the coastal state under the latter article. In sum, when
given an option between broad language and limiting language, the
committee chose to use broad, power-conferring language in Article 73. It is
nevertheless important to note that Article 73 was drafted by a different
committee than Articles 220 and 230.115
3.

The Lotus Case Principle Further Supports This Interpretation of
Article 73

Finally, the Lotus case stands for the international law principle that
what is not prohibited by international law is allowed, supporting the nonexhaustive interpretation of Article 73(1). In S.S. Lotus, the Permanent
Court of International Justice (predecessor to the International Court of
Justice) held that the burden was on the moving party to establish a positive
restraint on the other state’s sovereignty.116 This has been interpreted to
mean that restrictions upon the independence of a state cannot be presumed;
rather, the international legal system is permissive—where states may act

111

Id. art. 73.
See Nordquist vol. II, supra note 34, at 792-95.
113
Id. at 794.
114
Id. at 795; LOSC, supra note 2, arts. 73, 220.
115
See Nordquist vol. II, supra note 34, at 15 (stating that the second committee was responsible for
drafting Articles 2-132, which includes Part V on the EEZ and sections of Articles 297 and 298, which
pertain to conflict resolution).
116
The S.S. Lotus Case (Fr. v. Tur.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 15 (Sept. 7 1926).
112
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when not prohibited to do so.117 In applying this principle to a coastal state’s
enforcement jurisdiction in its EEZ, one could conclude that the list of
prohibited actions in paragraph four indicates that what is not on the list is
permitted.
B.

ITLOS Litigation Suggests the Validity of Confiscation Provisions by
Allowing Them to Continue Functioning

In the Tomimaru case, ITLOS dealt specifically with confiscation
provisions and the relationship between national and international rules.118
In observing that the confiscation of a vessel must not upset the balance
between coastal and flag states’ rights, ITLOS implied that confiscation
provisions are allowable under LOSC.119 This implication is further
supported by the final judgment: in Tomimaru, the domestic court of the
coastal state’s final decision regarding the confiscation of the vessel
rendered the flag state’s application for “prompt release” without object.120
Thus, the Russian Supreme Court’s judgment was final.
Unlike the Tomimaru case, in which the domestic proceedings were
final before ITLOS rendered its judgment, the Volga proceedings were
pending in Australian federal court at the time of judgment.121 Ostensibly,
this is why the “prompt release” action was not deemed rendered without
object by the finality of the confiscation action as in the Tomimaru case.122
ITLOS is preserving its own discretion in this regard, relying on the
balancing of the coastal and flag states’ rights on a case-by-case basis
instead of establishing a bright line rule.
Still, the Tomimaru judgment suggests some limitations on coastal
state forfeiture provisions. Even though vessel forfeiture appears to be
lawful according to ITLOS, there are limitations imposed on this type of
measure. Most importantly, the confiscation measure must not upset the
balance between coastal and flag states’ rights.123 This view, espoused by
ITLOS, is consistent as one of the guiding principles in the EEZ regime
established in LOSC.124 Although no legal instrument provides specific

117

Daniel Erasmus Kahn, Max Huber as Arbitrator: The Palmas (Miangas) Case and Other
Arbitrations, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 145, 157, n.62 (Feb. 2007).
118
Wolfrum UN Statement, supra note 13, ¶ 23.
119
Tomimaru, supra note 12, Judgment ¶ 75.
120
Id. Judgment ¶ 79.
121
Volga, supra note 58, Judgment ¶ 52.
122
Tomimaru, supra note 12, Judgment ¶¶ 78, 82.
123
See id. Judgment ¶ 75.
124
See generally supra Part II.B.

694

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 17 NO. 3

rules to follow to conserve this balance within a confiscation proceeding,125
ITLOS judgments and separate opinions offer some guidance as to what to
look for in ensuring adequate protection of the flag state’s rights. These
documents, along with a careful reading of Article 73, provide a framework
within which to formulate a test for determining the validity of a forfeiture
provision.
C.

A Suggested Test for Determining the Validity of a Forfeiture
Provision

Recent ITLOS decisions, undisputed state practice, and the language
in Article 73 demonstrate that the confiscation of vessels as an enforcement
measure within a coastal state’s EEZ conforms with international law. An
analysis of these same sources provides a possible test for determining the
legality of such a provision.
1.

A Confiscation Provision May Not Have the Effect of Denying a Flag
State Access to a “Prompt Release” Action

Although the effect of confiscation may vary, such a provision would
certainly be invalid if it had the effect of preventing the flag state from
invoking its right to a “prompt release” action before ITLOS. By prohibiting
certain enforcement measures and ensuring a flag state’s right to a “prompt
release” action, Article 73 safeguards the balance of interest between coastal
and flag states.126 It is logical that a coastal state measure undertaken
pursuant to its enforcement jurisdiction granted by Article 73 may not
undermine a flag state’s access to a “prompt release” action. ITLOS stated
that the forfeiture provision must not simply be a means to prevent the flag
state from bringing a “prompt release” action.127 The language in this dicta
introduces an element of intent, pointing to the reasoning behind forfeiture
legislation as helpful in the analysis of legality. The forfeiture proceeding,
therefore, must not interfere with the function of Article 292, nor must it
intend to.128 This is not to say that a law that unintentionally short-circuited
“prompt release” would be valid; rather, the intention of a law can assist in
determining the effect it may have.

125
126
127
128

See supra Parts II.B, II.C.
LOSC, supra note 2, art. 73; see supra Part II.C.
Tomimaru, supra note 12, Judgment ¶ 76.
See id. Judgment ¶¶ 75-76.
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According to ITLOS, a final confiscation action in a domestic forum
renders a “prompt release” action without object.129 This conforms with
ITLOS’s previous assertion that it is not “an appellate forum against a
decision of a national court,”130 and with international tribunals’ treatment of
complementarity: a traditional policy of non-interference with domestic
adjudication.131 In contrast, ITLOS declined to hold that it could not hear
“prompt release” actions related to cases pending in domestic fora, albeit
amid dissent.132 This necessarily follows from the requirement that a
forfeiture provision not impede an Article 292 action. If a case pending in a
domestic forum estopped ITLOS’s ability to hear a related “prompt release”
claim, the forfeiture action would necessarily affect the operation of Article
292.
Similarly, Russia’s contention in Tomimaru that the nationality of a
vessel is affected by a confiscation measure cannot stand to the requirement
that a forfeiture provision not affect the operation of Article 292.133 Russia
argued that the flag state of the vessel was no longer Japan because the
vessel had been forfeited to Russia.134 Because this would effectively
prevent the original flag state from bringing a “prompt release” action,
upsetting the balance between coastal and flag states’ rights, ITLOS rejected
this argument.135 Article 92 states that a vessel may not change its flag in the
course of a voyage, except in the case of a “real transfer of ownership or
change of registry.”136 Even though this seems to indicate a connection
between ownership and nationality, it does not prescribe such a connection.
Because the nationality of a vessel does not depend on the nationality of the
owner,137 a coastal state can claim a vessel as forfeited without changing its
nationality. Even if the coastal state is the new owner of the vessel, it does
not automatically become the flag state. To the contrary, interpreting a
forfeiture provision to affect the nationality of a vessel would be inconsistent

129
130

Id. Judgment ¶¶ 76, 81.
The Monte Confurco Case (Seychelles v. Fr.), I.T.L.O.S. Case No. 6 (Dec. 18 2000), Judgment ¶

72.
131

See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
See Tomimaru, supra note 12, Separate Opinion of Judge Lucky at 10, 13 (stating that he would
hold that a forfeiture claim pending before a domestic forum renders a prompt release action without
object).
133
See Tomimaru, supra note 12, Argument ¶ 42.
134
Id.
135
Id. Judgment ¶ 80.
136
LOSC, supra note 2, art. 92(1).
137
See id. art. 92 (setting forth requirements for establishing the nationality of a vessel without
making mention of ownership).
132
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with LOSC. Because nationality and ownership of vessels are distinct, it is
possible to conclude that forfeiture does not affect a vessel’s nationality.
2.

The Forfeiture Procedure Must Grant Effective Access to a Domestic
Forum in Which to Challenge the Forfeiture, Ensuring Some Due
Process

ITLOS has indicated that a confiscation measure that frustrates the
possibility of recourse to domestic remedies would violate international
standards of due process.138 Accordingly, a forfeiture provision must
provide concerned parties recourse to available domestic remedies. Giving
the flag state notice and time to respond to the action, in conformity with
international standards for due process of law, will help ensure that this
recourse is effective.
Article 73(4) requires coastal states to provide notice to the flag state
in case of arrest or detention, and of any further punitive measures it
takes.139 The notification must take place via “appropriate channels.”140 As
such, a notice requirement should figure into the due process analysis.
Like all enforcement measures, a forfeiture provision must not deny
due process of law. ITLOS noted in the Tomimaru case that Japan did not
claim that the Russian proceedings were inconsistent with international
standards of due process of law, implying that had the argument been made,
ITLOS would have considered the issue.141 In his separate opinion, Judge
Lucky reasoned that Russia’s proceedings were consistent with international
standards of due process and recommended that ITLOS adopt a presumption
in favor of a state’s domestic proceedings.142 In contrast, separate opinions
in the Juno Trader case suggested that the Guinean proceedings did not
provide due process of law.143 Because ITLOS dismissed that action on
procedural grounds, the issue was not litigated. Still, ITLOS seems to
conflate a due process analysis with the availability of a domestic forum in
which to challenge the forfeiture, and the adequacy of that forum.
Although there is no test for the effectiveness of the access to the
domestic courts, ITLOS suggests that the Russian proceedings in the
Tomimaru were sufficient, whereas those in the Juno Trader were not. This
spectrum, combined with a notice requirement, provides a framework within
138
139
140
141
142
143

See Tomimaru, supra note 12, Judgment ¶ 79.
LOSC, supra note 2, art. 73(4).
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Tomimaru, supra note 12, Judgment ¶ 79.
Id. Separate Opinion of Judge Lucky at 7.
Juno Trader, supra note 58.
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which to analyze the effectiveness of the domestic courts as a forum in
which to challenge a vessel forfeiture.
The fact that Russia allowed Japan to contest the forfeiture in its court
system aided ITLOS in ruling that the “prompt release” was without object.
In fact, ITLOS found it significant that Japan had waited so long before
bringing the application to ITLOS.144 A flag state’s prolonged delay defeats
the purpose behind a “prompt release” action—“prompt release” is meant to
ensure timeliness of process. Several separate opinions also suggested that
the access to the Russian courts aided the determination that there was no
due process violation.145
In sum, a vessel forfeiture provision, to be legal, must not deny a flag
state’s right to an Article 292 “prompt release” action and must grant
effective access to a domestic forum in which to contest the forfeiture of the
vessel. Although these elements overlap, response to litigation brought
before ITLOS suggests that they should factor into the analysis separately.
As the “effectiveness” test of the access to the domestic forum helps to
ensure compliance with international due process standards, the right to a
“prompt release” action similarly helps to balance coastal and flag states’
rights.
IV.

AUSTRALIA’S FORFEITURE PROVISION CAN AND SHOULD BE
INTERPRETED IN CONFORMITY WITH THIS TEST

FMA section 106A provides for the automatic forfeiture of vessels
fishing illegally.146 Part IV of this Comment applies the test established in
Part III to Australia’s statute, and argues that section 106A does not deny a
flag state access to an Article 292 “prompt release” action and that it
provides a domestic forum in which an interested party may effectively
contest the forfeiture. Because the automatic nature of the Australian statute
deserves special attention, a separate analysis of the effect of this feature is
appropriate prior to the application of the test.

144

See Tomimaru, supra note 12, Judgment ¶ 77.
See id. Judgment ¶ 76 (suggesting that ITLOS may engage in a due process analysis when there
have been domestic proceedings); but see id., Declaration of Judge Nelson and Separate Opinion of Judge
Jesus ¶ 9(b) (reasoning that complementarity issues bar ITLOS from making these types of “value
judgments”).
146
See supra Part II.D.
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The Automatic Nature of the Provision, Albeit Untraditional, Is Not
Dispositive of Legality

Although the automatic nature of Australia’s forfeiture provision
could seem too extreme to meet international standards for due process, both
the motivation behind the amendment and the subsequent application of the
provision mitigate such concerns. The motivation behind this legislation is
significant in that, according to ITLOS dicta, the reason for its existence
cannot be to prevent “prompt release” actions.147 Circumstances indicate
that the FMA amendment was prompted by one specific case, the Aliza
Glacial litigation.148 In Aliza Glacial, because Australia’s interest in the
vessel was merely a potential interest dependent on the conviction of a crew
member, the Australian courts found it subject to the interest of the mortgage
holder, a Norwegian bank.149 As such, the purpose of the automatic nature
of the forfeiture provision is to ensure that Australian conservation and
management enforcement measures, such as investigations and judicial
action, are not frustrated by third parties such as foreign mortgagees,150 and
not to frustrate flag state actions for “prompt release.”151
Similarly, the effect of the automatic nature of the provision is not to
prevent owners or flag states from contesting forfeiture. Indeed, the AFMA,
charged with applying forfeitures, has explicitly stated its understanding that
Australia must comply with LOSC.152 In the same vein, the AFMA lays out
procedures for challenging forfeiture within Australia, if the owner or
another interested party wishes to do so, demonstrating conformity with at
least basic notions of due process.153
B.

The Australian Legislation Does Not Deny a Flag State Access to a
“Prompt Release” Action

The FMA amendment providing for automatic vessel forfeiture was
intended to hold illegal fishing beneficiaries responsible, not to prevent
147

See supra Part III.C.
Bergensbanken ASA v. The Ship “Aliza Glacial,” Fed. Ct. of Austl., (unreported decision Mar. 20
1998, Ryan, J.); Bergensbanken ASA v. The Ship “Aliza Glacial” (1998) 1642 F.C.A. 4 [hereinafter Aliza
Glacial]; Rachel Baird, Coastal State Fisheries Management: A Review of Australian Enforcement Action
in the Heard and MacDonald Islands Australian Fishing Zone, 9 DEAKIN L. REV. 91, 104 (2004).
149
Aliza Glaicial, supra note 148.
150
Id. ¶ 48 (citing Explanatory Memorandum to the Fisheries Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 1)
1999, 2006 FCAFC 75).
151
Maritime law recognizes a variety of contract and tort liens on vessels. Protecting these third
party interests could be an issue in this legislation; however, it is beyond the scope of this Comment.
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See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
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See infra Part IV.C.
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“prompt release” actions.154 Indeed, successful “prompt release” actions
continued to be brought after the 1999 amendment to the FMA. In
particular, the Volga case litigated in ITLOS demonstrates that Australia
does not intend to deprive flag states of their right to “prompt release”
actions. When the Volga was seized and forfeited, Russia, the flag state,
instituted “prompt release” proceedings in ITLOS.155 In simply arguing that
the bond it was requesting was reasonable, Australia did not in any way
attempt to challenge Russia’s ability to bring the action.156 In addition,
Australia released the crew on bail, in compliance with Article 73(3).157
This could be recognized as a demonstration of good faith.
Australian courts have also suggested that the automatic nature of the
confiscation provision is not intended to disable a flag state’s “prompt
release” action.158 Instead, it gives Australia the ability to seek recognition
of its title to the vessel in other jurisdictions through foreign legal
processes.159 The court further proposed that this could offset the problem of
IUU fishers fleeing to the high seas by making the title to the vessel
“insecure” in any jurisdiction that would recognize Australia’s title, helping
to close the accountability gap in IUU fishing.160 This view has been
espoused by Australian politicians and fisheries administrators.161 Senator
Ian MacDonald, Australian Fisheries Minister from 2002 until 2006,
suggested that seizing vessels in foreign ports as forfeited would be a
desirable method of upholding the automatic forfeitures.162 Importantly, he
also indicated that this could and would be done with international
cooperation.163
Although the AFMA’s position on the issue of vessel nationality is
unclear, it has stated that Australia is subject to LOSC, which provides
obligations consistent with only certain interpretations of nationality rules.
In its 2006-2007 yearly report, the AFMA referred to “the previously
Uruguayan flagged Viarsa I.”164
This could suggest, somewhat
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161

See supra Part IV.A.
Volga, supra note 58, Factual Background, Judgment ¶¶ 30-54.
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Id. ¶ 76.
Id.
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problematically, that the administration is claiming that the nationality of the
vessel has changed as a result of the forfeiture. However, this same
administrative body also asserted that “[u]nder [LOSC], Australia is obliged
to return vessels to owners on payment of a bond,”165 indicating the AFMA’s
understanding that Australia is bound to allow “prompt release” actions by
the flag states of vessels seized by Australia as automatically forfeited. It
also means that Australia is not claiming that a change in ownership results
in a change in nationality. In the Viarsa I case, Australia may have changed
the registry of the vessel once the court dismissed the owner’s challenge to
the automatic forfeiture. This way Australia’s title to the vessel, although
valid pending a decision on the challenge, is still subject to certain rights
possessed by the previous owner and flag state. As such, a coastal state
could legitimately change the nationality of a forfeited vessel once the
forfeiture is in fact final. It seems that the AFMA is making a distinction
between its rights after an automatic forfeiture but prior to a final ruling and
its rights after a final ruling on the forfeiture, thus conserving the original
flag state’s rights to a “prompt release” action.
Section 106A of the FMA, providing for the automatic forfeiture of a
vessel and its catch upon the commission of the listed infractions in the EEZ,
can be interpreted to conform to the standards set by ITLOS, but Australia
must do this.
C.

Australia’s Forfeiture Provision Establishes Procedures to Ensure
That the Access to Its Domestic Courts Is Effective

The FMA provides for effective notice, response time, and sets out
specific procedures through which to challenge the forfeiture of a vessel,
ensuring a minimum standard of due process in the Australian automatic
vessel forfeiture provision. Furthermore, a vessel may only be seized if
there are reasonable grounds to believe that it has indeed been used in
committing a fisheries offense.166
The Australian forfeiture provision requires officials to provide
“effective notice” to the owner of the forfeited vessel upon seizure.167
Because Article 73(4) requires the notice to be given to the flag state through
“appropriate channels,” notice to the owners of the vessel is arguably
sufficient. Owners are aware of the “prompt release” proceedings and the
necessary role of the flag state, and will therefore notify the flag state of the
165
166
167
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coastal state action.168 Although the statute would certainly be stronger if it
required notice to be given to the flag state specifically, notice to the owner
is certainly effective, and arguably an “appropriate channel.” As such, the
notice Section 106C of the Act prescribes complies with Article 73(4).
This notification method is especially appropriate in light of the
option for a party to bring a “prompt release” action on behalf of the flag
state of a vessel that exists in Article 292.169 This grants private parties
access to a forum which is traditionally reserved for states. Many “prompt
release” actions have been brought pursuant to this quasi-private right to act
on behalf of the flag state. In fact, all but one of the Patagonian toothfish
“prompt release” cases were brought “on behalf” of the flag state, and not by
the flag state itself.170 This supports the claim that notifying the owner of a
vessel will result in effective notification of the flag state because the owner
and flag state must work together.
In addition, the FMA gives owners thirty days to file a claim
contesting the forfeiture,171 effectively giving the owner the time to respond
(which is suggested as a requirement in ITLOS dicta).172 Once a claim is
filed, the owner must institute proceedings in Australian courts within two
months.173 The two months response time provided by FMA Section 106F
allows the owner, the flag state, or other interested parties time to seek
enforcement of their claim contesting vessel forfeiture in Australian courts.
The Viarsa I case exposes the difference in evidentiary standards
between criminal and civil cases. In that case, the difference in the standard
required to prove the alleged violation was dispositive of the outcomes of
the civil and criminal proceedings. In fact, the legality of this forfeiture
could depend on the judge’s reasoning in his dismissal of the claim. This
case is interesting because evidence of the violation was not sufficient to
convict the crew on criminal charges, supporting the owner’s claim that the
forfeiture was unlawful. Because the claim was dismissed, the standard of
proof applied by the judge in the civil forfeiture proceeding must have been
lower than for the criminal proceeding. While there was no judgment on the
dismissal of the claim, there is a paper trail of hearings and orders entered,
demonstrating the owner’s recourse to the domestic courts in which to
168
LOSC, supra note 2, art. 292(2). “The application for release may be made only by or on behalf
of the flag State of the vessel.” Id.
169
Id.
170
Tullio Treves, Flags of Convenience Before the Law of the Sea Tribunal, 6 SAN DIEGO INT’L L. J.
179, 184 (2004) (former ITLOS Judge finding this right of action somewhat problematic).
171
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172
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173
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challenge the forfeiture. 174 Still, it would be interesting to know whether the
dismissal was based on a finding that a violation did in fact occur. The FMA
does require a finding of reasonable belief that a violation did occur prior to
seizing a vessel, mitigating these concerns.175
Still, unlike Guinea-Bissau’s confiscation procedures at issue in Juno
Trader, the Australian forfeiture provision establishes procedures through
which ship owners, flag states, and other interested parties can challenge the
legal or factual bases for the administrative decision giving rise to forfeiture.
As such, it is unlikely that ITLOS would find Australia’s notice procedures
inadequate or its domestic proceedings not in conformity with international
standards of due process.
D.

Australian Case Law Demonstrates That the Forfeiture Legislation
Grants Effective Access to a Domestic Forum in Which to Challenge
the Confiscation

The FMA sets forth the procedures through which to resolve a dispute
over a forfeiture action.176 Not only does it provide an avenue for contesting
forfeiture,177 but case law amply demonstrates that Australia grants owners
of confiscated vessels and other interested parties access to a domestic
forum. Parties may challenge the forfeiture on legal grounds as well as
factual grounds. They may either use the forfeiture contest procedure to
establish that the relevant fisheries offense did not occur or use the
Australian domestic courts to challenge a legal aspect of the statute. Indeed,
several cases have been litigated in this manner in the Australian federal
courts, contesting both legal and factual determinations.178
In Scandinavian Bunkering AS v. Bunkers on Board the Ship SV
Taruman and Others,179 the plaintiffs questioned the operation of FMA
Section 106A. The issue in that case was whether the fuel bunkers on board
the confiscated vessel were legally confiscated as part of “the boat” as the

174
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175
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176
See supra Part II.D.
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term is used in the governing statute.180 The court determined that they were
part of the boat and as such legally forfeited along with the vessel.181
The corporate owners of the Volga, Olbers, also brought several suits
in Australian Federal Court, culminating in the dismissal of Olbers’ appeal to
the full federal court.182 The Olbers proceedings in Australian courts were
similar to the Russian proceedings in Tomimaru, which were impliedly
upheld by the entire ITLOS, and explicitly by Judge Lucky.183 Like the
Russian plaintiffs, Olbers chose to litigate in the domestic forum. Olbers
advanced multiple arguments ranging from the constitutionality of Section
106A to contesting the factual determination that the Volga had been fishing
in the Australian EEZ.184 As demonstrated, foreign owners and other
interested parties are granted access to the Australian domestic courts to
challenge legal and factual issues related to vessel forfeiture.
E.

Australia Should Ensure That Interpretation of FMA Section 106A
Accords with International Law

Although issues relating to hot pursuit as defined by Article 111 are
among those presented by commentators, these are not detrimental to the
legality of the forfeiture provision. It is in Australia’s interest to make
certain that its forfeiture provision is interpreted consistently with LOSC, as
this will promote international cooperation in effective fisheries
conservation and management.185
Some have claimed that the Olbers decisions suggest a departure from
LOSC compliance on the part of Australia, especially its conformity with
Article 111, relating to hot pursuit.186 In Olbers, the owners submitted that
at the time of the boarding, Australia had not complied with all the elements
of hot pursuit. Although Australia responded in kind, factually arguing that
it had satisfied these elements, Judge French reasoned that it did not matter
because Australia was the owner of the boat when the officers boarded it.
Expanding this reasoning to claim that Australia may board vessels on the
180
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high seas it has reason to believe were violating its fisheries laws within its
EEZ would not conform with international law, and should be avoided.
Significantly, Australia did not argue for this interpretation in Olbers, and
the statements on hot pursuit were not part of the holding of the case.187
Australia’s reputation for overly strict enforcement of fisheries laws
may have played a role in the jury’s decision to acquit the crew in the Viarsa
I criminal proceedings. The crew asserted that their flight from Australia’s
EEZ stemmed from their concern that Australia would undertake illegal
enforcement action. Evidence of extreme enforcement measures not in
compliance with LOSC would continue to undermine Australia’s reputation
and discourage international cooperation.
The Federal Court’s dismissal of the owner of the Viarsa I’s challenge
to the forfeiture of that vessel could be problematic. In fact, the legality of
Australia’s actions could depend on the reasoning in the dismissal of that
claim. Although the FMA requires that there be reasonable grounds for
suspicion of the alleged offense for officials to seize a vessel, thus ensuring
some minimum factual showing for this procedure, given the high profile of
the case, it would be beneficial to publish some sort of reasoning on the
merits of the case. News reports have claimed that the Australia forfeiture
clause in uncontestable.188 This is not the intent or the effect of the
legislation,189 and there is no reason not to allay these allegations. The
Viarsa plaintiffs filed several motions and there were multiple hearings.190
Accordingly, the Australian court should make clear the reasons behind its
dismissal of the challenge by issuing an opinion rather than a simple order.
V.

CONCLUSION

Given the choice, Australia should interpret its automatic forfeiture
provision to conform to international law in order to maintain international
credibility and reciprocal treatment. Such an interpretation would further
Australia’s goal of attaining a level of sustainable fisheries management
worldwide. In general, vessel forfeiture is a valid coastal state enforcement
measure to effectively deter illegal fishing in its EEZ. Although the
automatic nature of Australia’s forfeiture provision raises due process
187
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concerns, the procedures established by the statute effectively safeguard the
rights of the owners and flag states. Likewise, the AFMA’s assertion that
Australia remains bound by “prompt release” requirements protects the
rights of a seized vessel’s flag state. Finally, Australia’s domestic courts are
open to foreign vessel owners or states wishing to challenge the forfeiture of
a vessel. As such, Section 106A of the FMA satisfies the proposed test for
legality.
Although the dismissals without published judgments of the appeals
of vessel owners such as Olbers (Volga) and Navalmar (Viarsa) leave open
questions about the legality of the Australian forfeiture provision,
interpretation in conformity with international law is possible. It is in
Australia’s interest to clarify the reasoning applied in these final decisions
regarding vessel forfeiture in order to maintain the international legitimacy
of its maritime regulations.

